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1 Introduction.
When agents interact within an institutional framework, the structure of the institution plays a central role in determining outcomes: it determines the choices agents can make, the strategic considerations involved, and how actions translate into outcomes. For example, in the context of voting, when a group of individuals must select some alternative, voting by v eto, majority rule, and so on, are alternative institutions that select outcomes. The design of institutions which produce desirable outcomes (by some criteria) is a fundamental problem of economic theory.
The theory of implementation and mechanism design is concerned with institutional design in situations where outcomes in an environment are exogenously given and where the objective i s t o s p e c i f y r u l e s o f interaction between agents that lead to desirable outcomes. What constitutes a desirable outcome will typically depend on the characteristics of the agents involved (the state), varying as these characteristics vary. F or example, in designing a voting procedure to select between two candidates, a common requirement is that the chosen candidate be top ranked by at least half the voters. Here, at any state the desired outcome (among two alternatives) is that preferred by the majority. In this case, as preferences of voters change, so does the best choice of candidate. If the institution is to survive o ver time and produce appropriate outcomes as participants (preferences) vary, the institutional details should be independent o f t h e c haracteristics of individuals. The institution must, for a given collection of participants, generate strategic considerations that lead the interaction of those agents to a desired outcome, and as preferences vary, the institution must generate new and appropriate strategic considerations, leading to the correct outcome at the new state. Given a rule associating outcomes to states (a social choice rule), this implicitly imposes requirements on the variation of preferences across states in order to structure incentives appropriately, so that as preferences vary the outcome generated by the institution varies accordingly. This leads to the central di culty arising in the design of mechanisms in implementation theory, and when a mechanism exists with equilibrium outcomes that track the social choice rule as states vary, the choice rule is said to be implementable.
Di erent forms of mechanism re ect di erent institutional features. Thus, for example, majority v oting is a situation in which a g e n ts move s i m ultaneously and the outcome is then selected. This is naturally modeled as a strategic form game. Voting by v eto highlights important temporal features { the choice made by one agent m a y restrict the choices of others, and is most naturally modeled as multi-stage game.
For mechanisms modeled as strategic form games the central characterizing property of implementable social choice rules is monotonicity. Monotonicity is a necessary property of a social choice rule for the rule to be implementable in a strategic form mechanism. Monotonicity w as introduced by Maskin (1977) and requires that if an outcome is selected by the social choice rule at some state and in moving to another state the outcome falls in no agent's ranking, then the social choice rule should select the same outcome at the new state. The intuition is natural: if the outcome doesn't fall in anyone's ranking and was previously chosen, then since no one previously wished to challenge the outcome they will not do so in the new state where it is now r a n k ed at least as highly. Alternatively, if the outcome selected by the social choice rule varies in moving from one state to another it must be that at the new state the outcome chosen at the old state is ranked lower than it was at the old state (relative to some alternative), for some individual. Phrased this way, the requirement highlights the need for su cient v ariability in preferences relative to the social choice rule. Maskin's monotonicity condition applies to complete information environments. In the context of incomplete information environments, which w e focus on here, there is an analogous condition called Bayesian monotonicity. B a yesian monotonicity w as identi ed by P ostlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) as a necessary condition for strategic form implementation. Jackson (1991) provides necessary and su cient conditions for strategic form implementation in incomplete information economic environments. The problem of nding necessary and su cient conditions in general incomplete information environments is far more di cult. See, for example, Sen (1994 and 1995) . Subsequent to the work on strategic form implementation, research proceeded in at least three directions. consider strategic form games, and focus on a re nement of Nash equilibrium, excluding those equilibria in which some agent p l a ys a weakly dominated strategy. Abreu and Sen (1991) , Abreu and Matsushima (1990) and Matsushima (1990) reformulate the problem by w orking with lotteries on outcomes and exploit the linearity o f v onNeumannMorgenstern preferences. Extensive form implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium is considered by Abreu and Sen (1991) and Moore and Repullo (1988) .
Use of extensive forms is particularly well suited to incomplete information implementation since these games provide a natural framework for signaling and information transmission. Recently, Baliga (1993) , Bergin and Sen (1993) , and Brusco (1995) have considered the impact of using extensive form games to implement s o c i a l c hoice rules. In the complete information context, subgame perfection is a natural choice for the solution concept. In incomplete information environments, the analogous requirement is sequential rationality | t h a t p l a yers should make optimal choices whenever called on to move. Sequential rationality is standard in most solution concepts 1 and requires that agents make rational choices relative to some belief system. The speci cation of beliefs is implicitly determined by the choice of solution concept (such as sequential equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, equilibrium based on forward induction belief restrictions, and so on). However, because equilibria are sensitive to belief speci cation, whether a game implements a given social choice rule or not depends critically on how belief restrictions are imposed. We approach this problem by focusing on beliefs (posterior distributions) that are su cient to permit implementation, independent of the solution concept. Apart from having the advantage that the conditions are independent of the equilibrium concept (given sequential rationality), the approach allow s t h e r e s u l t s t o b e i n terpreted in terms of standard signaling ideas. We primarily consider games that have no equilibria that go beyond a rst stage. (This is conventional in complete information extensive form mechanisms.) We refer to such a game as a game with one round of signaling. In the context of incomplete information a signi cant virtue is that it avoids the di culty o f h a ving to track sequences of posterior distributions and inevitable dependence of the implementation on the precise manner in which a solution concept restricts beliefs.
A k ey insight of the recent literature on implementation theory is the crucial role played by appropriate preference reversals in successful implementation. In normal form implementation this reversality requirement is called Bayesian monotonicity and postulates the existence of an allocation that undergoes preference reversals vis-a-vis the allocations that arise under truth-telling and deception. An important feature of these reversals is that they occur with respect to the prior distribution on types. Allowing for multiple stages in the game form permits a signi cant w eakening of the Bayesian monotonicity requirement: we can now a d d itionally use posterior distributions to generate reversals, and we can create more nely tuned incentives in the multistage framework. For example, a type report when an agent reports \truthfully" conveys di erent information than the same report when the agent reports \dishonestly", and hence may lead to di erent behavior.
To m o t i v ate the signaling role of beliefs in the simplest possible way, consider a situation where a player has two possible and equally likely types, a and b. Suppose that the player's strategy is to announce a type. Suppose also that one strategy (saŷ ) announces a when the player is type a and announces b when the player is type b. Another strategy, , announces b when the player is type a and announces a when type b. Under^ , the posterior distribution over types given the announcement b is that the agent i s t ype b with probability 1, while under~ and given b, the posterior distribution puts probability 1 o n t ype a. L e t P ( j y) denote the posterior distribution conditional on y when strategy is used, so that P^ (a j b) = 0 a n d P~ (a j b) = 1 . T h us, the posterior distributions are distinct. 2 In this discussion Bayesian updating is used | the relevant e v ent i n e a c h case has positive probability. Generally, i n m ultistage games in deriving beliefs two complications arise: it's necessary to consider the structure of beliefs on zero probability e v ents and secondly, with many agents and correlated types, these beliefs are not uniquely de ned when conditioning on events that have zero probability. N e v ertheless, it turns out that properties similar to those described above are preserved in belief systems. We exploit this fact in a game form to generate di erent b e h a vior in subforms of the extensive form, depending on the strategies used by agents (in particular \truth-telling" and \deception" strategies). From a technical perspective, there are two w ays in which this variation in behavior may occur. A change in the distribution over nodes in a subform may c hange the distribution over outcomes simply because di erent c hoices are made at di erent n o d e s a n d a c hange in the distribution over nodes of the subform may alter the choices made at a given node. In section 2 we describe the model and introduce extensive form implementation in section 3. There, we p r o vide three examples that are central in motivating the discussion. The rst two illustrate the ideas described above (on the impact of variation in distributions over subform nodes). The third example gives a social choice function that can be implemented in the extensive form but fails the Abreu-Matsushima necessary condition (measurability) for implementation in the normal form. This is in contrast to the complete information case where normal form re nements are more powerful than subgame perfection in the extensive form. The example is constructed so that the interim expected utilities are type independent (although the ex post utilities depend on the type pro les). As a result, the only Abreu-Matsushima measurable functions are constant on the type space, and any s o c i a l c hoice function that varies over types fails measurability. Implicitly, the measurability of a social choice function depends on the prior distribution over types via the interim expected utilities. Implementation is possible in the extensive f o r m b y shifting the problem to a subform where posterior distributions are such that di erent t ypes of an agent h a ve di erent incentives as the (consistent) posterior distributions vary between truth-telling and deception. In section 4 we describe the posterior reversal condition and give a su ciency condition for extensive form implementation. A central requirement of posterior reversal is that for any deception there is some signal such that the posterior under truth-telling at that signal is distinct from the posterior under deception (in fact at out of equilibrium signals we deal with sets of distributions, so the condition is formulated in terms of disjointedness of sets of posterior distributions.) We illustrate the condition with the examples and give s o m e simpli cations of the condition for special cases. In addition, we c o n trast the ideas in posterior reversal with Bayesian monotonicity and some extensions. In section 5 we conclude with a discussion of the literature. 2 The Model.
The set of agents is denoted I, w i t h I = f1 2 : : : n g. In the incomplete information environment, each agent i has a set of types, S i . In addition, a xed prior distribution, , o ver types S = n i=1 S i is given. We assume that S is nite and that for each s 2 S, (s) > 0. The set of outcomes is denoted A. An allocation is a rule that assigns outcomes to types. Formally, De nition 1 An allocation is a function x : S ! A.
Denote by X the set of all allocations. The utility function of player i is a function from A S to R, u i : A S ! R . Given an allocation x and a distribution on S (the prior distribution), the expected utility o f a g e n t i conditional on type s i 2 S i is V i (x s i j ) = P s;i2S;i u i (x(s) s ) (s ;i j s i ). (Given a vector x, x ;i is obtained from x by deleting the i th component.) A binary relation on allocations (X) i s then de ned according to: xR i (s i )y , V i (x s i j ) V i (y s i j ). When the inequality is strict write xP i (s i )y.
De nition 2A social choice correspondence (SCC), F, is a subset of X, the set of allocations. In the case where the SCC contains just one element o f X so F = fxg, it is called a Social Choice Function (SCF). Intuitively, the outcome x(s) is the preferred social outcome at player type pro le s. H o wever, the types vector s is not observable. In a mechanism where agents report their types with reportŝ leading to outcome x(ŝ), then under truthful reporting the desired outcome is achieved. In general, agents incentives may con ict with truthful reporting and this in turn may lead to deceptions by a g e n ts, reporting types other than the true type.
De nition 3A deception for i is a i :
Denote bŷ i the identity function on S i and bŷ the identity function on S. Given an outcome function x and 2 D, de ne x : x (s) x( (s)) 8s 2 S. T h us, if agent i adopts the reporting strategy^ i , then the agent plans to report truthfully. If the agent adopts the reporting strategy 6 = , then for some type of s i of i, the player plans to report dishonestly, reporting, say, s i = i (s i ) 6 = s i . When, for each i, truthful reporting by other agents leads to it being optimal for i to report truthfully, then the social choice function satis es \self selection". Formally, De nition 4The social choice function F = fxg satis es self selection if xR i (s i )x (~ i ^ ;i) 8~ i 2 D i s i 2 S i i2 I: Self selection (or incentive compatibility) is an essential requirement of \implementable" social choice functions. If the social choice function satis es self-selection, then in a type announcement game (a \direct mechanism") truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium in the game where agents receive x(s) when the announcement i s s. If the social choice function fails self-selection then there is no mechanism (direct or otherwise), in which the equilibrium leads to the outcome s at type pro le s, for all s 2 S (Myerson (1979)).
Remark 1 Throughout the paper we focus on pure strategies and restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria. This is conventional although not universal. The concept of Bayesian monotonicity (see below) is central in the literature and is de ned for deceptions that do not involve randomization. Working with pure strategies has the virtue that we maintain comparability with much of the existing literature. However, many of our characterizations require no reference to the issue of pure versus mixed strategies. Since the distinction is important, we will indicate where the distinction is not signi cant o r d o e s n o t p l a y a crucial role. Remark 2 When Bayesian monotonicity holds, conditions 1 and 2 are satis ed at every (with x 6 = x).
When 1 and 2 hold at some given , w e s a y that Bayesian monotonicity is satis ed at . Motivation for this condition is given in and Palfrey (1992) . Necessary and su cient conditions for Nash implementation i n economic environments are given in Jackson (1991) . Given x y 2 X, and T S, de ne x T y = T x + ( 1 ; T )y, where T is the indicator function of T. Call
De nition 6An environment i s economic at if given z 2 X and s 2 S, 9i j 2 I (i 6 = j), x y 2 X x y both constant with (x T z)P i (s i )z and (y T z)P j (s j )z, 8T S such t h a t s 2 T . Say that an environment is economic if for each 2 (S), the environment is economic at . In \economic environments" with n 3, a social choice function is implementable in Nash equilibrium if and only if it satis es both self selection and Bayesian monotonicity ( J a c kson (1991)).
Extensive F orm Implementation
We denote an extensive form game of incomplete information by ;. A detailed description of extensive form games is given in Selten (1975) , and is too involved to fully review. Here we g i v e a minimal description of the relevant components. A path in the game is a state (type) pro le s 2 S and a history, h, of actions chosen by t h e p l a yers. Thus a path is a pair (s h). The set of all paths is denoted S H. A p a yo for each player is associated to each path: (h s) = f i (h s)g i , where i (h s) i s t h e p a yo to player i if the type pro le is s and the action history is h. An information set for player i is a subset of the set of histories, identifying those paths indistinguishable to the agent when required to move a n d a t ype, s i 2 S i . Let i 2 i be a behavioral strategy for player i in ;, specifying an action choice at each information set of i. Thus, a strategy for i can be written as f i (s i )g si2Si , where i (s i ), speci es an action for i, t ype s i at each information set. Given a strategy, = ( 1 2 : : : n ) 2 = i i , and a realization s 2 S, a p a yo to agent i is determined, say i ( s ). A prior distribution on S determines an expectation operator E such t h a t t h e expected payo to player i under strategy is E f i ( s )g and the conditional payo to player i, t ype s i is E f i ( s ) j s i g. Alternatively, n o t e t h a t e a c h strategy, , a n d t ype distribution determine a distribution, ' ( ) , o n H S with associated expectation operator E ( ) . F ormulated in this way, the expected payo to player i is E ( ) f i (h s)g, and the expected payo to player i type s i is E ( ) f i (h s) j s i g. Let I i denote the collection of information sets of player i. I f is a Nash equilibrium and the information set I i 2 I i is reached with positive probability g i v en the strategy and type distribution , t h e n :
This condition is called sequential rationality at I i and any Nash equilibrium strategy of the strategic form of the game induces sequential rationality along the equilibrium path. Beliefs on the equilibrium path are determined by B a yes' rule. However, it is necessary to model rational behavior of a player faced with an unanticipated decision problem (i.e. choosing optimally o the equilibrium path). If I i has probability 0 under ( ), an \appropriate" conditional distribution is assigned. Di erent solution concepts (perfection, sequential equilibrium, and various forms of perfect Bayesian equilibrium) develop di erent procedures for restricting out of equilibrium beliefs. This raises the di culty that equilibrium outcomes of a given extensive form may v ary with the solution concept and is obviously important for the implementation problem. We will return to this issue later. For now, we x some equilibrium criterion such as sequential equilibrium or perfect Bayesian equilibrium and use the term \equilibrium" to mean that some such solution concept has been adopted and the equilibrium is in terms of the solution criterion.
De nition 7An extensive form mechanism is an extensive form game of incomplete information, ;, with type space n i=1 S i , prior distribution over types, and outcomes determine by histories according to a rule a : H ! A. That a depends only on H, and not H S, re ects the fact that the mechanism cannot depend on unobservables (the player types). Thus, to each path in the game the mechanism associates an outcome. If the player type vector drawn by is s, then the payo to agent i is u i (a(h) s ). Thus with i (h s) = u i (a(h) s ), the expected payo to i is E ( ) fu i (a(h) s )g, and the expected payo to player i type s i is E ( ) fu i (a(h) s ) j s i g.
Given the extensive form game ;, let ; be the set of equilibrium strategies, or write ; ( ) t o m a k e explicit the dependence on . T h us, ; : ( S) ! . Let 2 ; ( ). A strategy pro le and the prior distribution, ( ), determine a distribution over histories, which w e denote '. F or each s 2 S a conditional distribution on A is determined according to De nition 8 The allocation x : S ! A is implementable in the extensive form in sequential equilibrium if there exists an extensive f o r m m e c hanism ; (with prior distribution on S), such t h a t t h e game has a sequential equilibrium and such t h a t i f is a sequential equilibrium, then x(s) = supp ( ) (B j s) 8s 2 S.
Remark 3 Implementation in perfect Bayesian equilibrium is de ned by replacing \sequential equilibrium" with \perfect Bayesian equilibrium" in this de nition. Implementation in other extensive form concepts is de ned analogously. When we need to work with a speci c solution concept, we use sequential equilibrium. Other solution concepts that impose sequential rationality a t e v ery information set would do equally well.
Examples.
In this section we discuss three examples. The rst example shows how the majority rule social choice function can be implemented in a public goods problem where Bayesian monotonicity fails. We provide a complete description of the (simple) implementing game form. The key feature of this example is that in moving from truth-telling to deception, the posterior distribution over types of some agent v aries. As long as di erent t ypes act di erently, this gives a di erent distribution over outcomes, comparing truth-telling to deception. The second example illustrates how t h e v ariation in the posterior (between truth-telling and deception) can cause the same type of a player to play di erently. This is again an example of posterior reversal, but also of chain reversal. The third example shows how complex strategic behavior generated by variation in beliefs may be exploited. We c hoose a social choice function that violates Abreu-Matsushima measurability and show h o w i t c a n b e i m p l e m e n ted in the extensive form. The example is constructed so that interim expected utilities are type i n d e p endent (making it impossible to elicit distinct type-dependent behavior). The example shows that it is sometimes necessary to use extensive form games to implement a social choice function.
Example 1: Implementing a Non-monotonic SCF
The following example is discussed in and Palfrey (1992) First, truth-telling is an equilibrium. For each t ype of each p l a yer, truth-telling weakly dominates non truthful reporting. If agent one announces c, the game goes to stage 2 when either (a a a) o r ( b b b) a r e announced, but in the rst case playe r 2 p i c ks a (since given 2 announces a, 2 is type a with probability 1 ) and in the second b, so the outcome is una ected. Thus truthful reporting by a l l p l a yers, player 1 selecting n in period 1 and 2 selecting his type if stage 2 is reached forms an equilibrium.
Next, there is no deception equilibrium where both a and b are announced with positive probability. T o see this, suppose otherwise. Then 9j k such t h a t p(a j j)p(b j k) > 0 (when j = k each t ype of j announces di erently). In this case player r = 2 f j kg faces a distribution where both a and b have positive probability of being announced by other players and so has a unique best response { reporting truthfully.
The only remaining possible \deception" equilibrium is one where When player 1 plays a (a) = a (b) = 1 and each t y p e o f 1 c hooses n, then neither playe r 2 o r 3 h a s any incentive to defect. However, if agent 1 t ype b \defects" to the signal c then conditional on agent 1 being type b, the game goes to stage 2 with probability 1 , s i n c e a is played with probability 1. Here, the posterior probability on agent 2 ' s t ype is the prior, so that with probability b , a g e n t 2 will choose b. T h us, the defection leads to b being chosen with probability b . S i n c e b > 0, agent 1 t ype b has the incentive to defect, thus upsetting these strategies as equilibrium strategies. Finally, note that there cannot be an equilibrium where in the rst stage each a g e n t announces (independent o f t ype) (a a a), say, and agent 1 type b announces c. In this case the game goes to stage two with positive probability ( b ), and conditional on reaching stage two, b is chosen with positive probability (again b ). This cannot be an equilibrium because agent 3 t ype a has an incentive to announce b: if agent 3 t ype a announces b, then conditional on agent 3 b e i n g t ype a, the outcome (a a b) occurs with probability 1 in stage 1 { so that a is chosen. A similar discussion applies when each player plays b with probability 1. This completes the example. The key feature here is the variation in the support of the distribution over player 2's types in the second stage, depending on whether reporting is truthful or dishonest. The second stage can be reached in two w ays: player 1 announces c, a n d t h e t ype pro le reported is either r . Thus, the di erence between truth-telling and deception in stage 2 is that the distribution over states changes while the action chosen at each state is the same in both cases. A t state s = ( s 1 s 2 s 3 ) the action chosen is s 2 in both truth-telling and deception, but in the truth-telling case prob(I a j c r a ) = 1, whereas in the deception, prob(I a j c r a ) = a < 1.
Example 2:
Implementing a SCF through posterior induced preference variation.
In this example we illustrate how posterior distributions directly play a k ey role in implementing a choice rule { the change in the support of the distribution alters sequentially rational behavior, so that di erent behavior occurs at the same state, as the posterior distribution varies from truth-telling to deception.
Suppose there are three agents. Agents 1 and 2 have singleton type sets while agent t h r e e h a s t wo possible types | S 3 = fa bg. There are four alternatives { A = fa b d eg. Agent s 1 a n d 2 h a ve preferences that depend on the type of agent 3 . The preferences of each a g e n t i are described by a function u i : A S 3 First, observe that truth-telling by p l a yer 3 and no challenge by 1 is an equilibrium. If playe r 1 c hallenges, c a takes the game to stage 2 when 3 announces a and here 2 will pick d (u 2 (d a) > u 2 (e a)), which i s w orse for 1 than a (u 1 (d a) < u 1 (a a)). Similarly, c b takes the game to stage 2 when 3 announces b and here 2 will pick e (u 2 (d b) < u 2 (e b)), which i s w orse for 1 than b (u 1 (e b) < u 1 (b b)). Next, there are three types of deception to consider: (i) both types announce a, ( ii) b o t h t ypes announce b, a n d ( iii) e a c h t ype announces the opposite type. We discuss these in turn. (i) I f b o t h t ypes of 3 announce a, t h e c hallenge c a takes the game to stage 2 where 2 picks e, s i n c e V 2 (e) > V 2 (d). Since V 1 (e) > V 1 (a), player 1 will select the challenge c a . With the challenge, player 3 type b gets u 3 (e b) < u 3 (b b), so player 3 type b would wish to switch to announce b. (Here, we use the fact that any s e q u e n tially consistent beliefs assign the same distribution over the types of player 3 following the challenge as is assigned by the prior distribution.) (ii) If both types of 3 announce b, the challenge c b takes the game to stage 2 where 2 picks e, since V 2 (e) > V 2 (d). Since V 1 (e) > V 1 (b), player 1 will select the challenge c b . In this case, player 3 type a gets u 3 (e a) < u 3 (b a) = u 3 (a a), so playe r 3 t ype a would wish to switch to announce a. ( iii) Finally, i f e a c h t ype of player 3 announces the opposite type, then the challenge c a leads to choice e by p l a ye r 2 w h e n a is announced (since 3 is type b), giving player 1 utility u 1 The important p o i n t in the example is the variation in behavior in period 2 of player 2, due to a change in the posterior distribution. Player 2 has just one type, but that type plays di erently depending on the posterior distribution over three's types. To see this in terms of information sets, consider the challenge c a with choice a by player 3 in stage 1. This takes the game to stage 2. Here, player 2 has just one information set, I = fa bg | 2 cannot distinguish the type of player 3. If 1 challenges with c a in the truth-telling equilibrium then if a is chosen by 3 in stage 1 the game goes to stage 2 where the posterior distribution puts probability 1 o n a. Since u 2 (d a) > u 2 (e a), player 2 will choose d. In the deception equilibrium where 3 chooses a independent o f t ype, the challenge c a takes the game to stage 2 where the posterior distribution is the same as the prior ( a b ). Now, 2 chooses e because V 2 (e) > V 2 (d).
Example 3: Implementing a Non-Measurable SCF.
In the literature on complete information games it is known that normal form re nements such a s e l i minating weakly dominated strategies are more powerful than extensive f o r m m e c hanisms for implementing social choice functions ). Similarly, with iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies very permissive results obtain (Abreu and Matsushima (1991) ). In incomplete information games these solution criteria are also powerful. Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that in incomplete information games, there are social choice functions that cannot be implemented by either of these criteria, but can be implemented in the extensive form. This section provides an example. Rather than provide details of the extensive form, we s h o w h o w a \ w edge" arises in the posterior distributions (in a game where agents announce types), depending on whether strategies are truth-telling or otherwise in the rst stage of a two stage game. This creates variation in the posterior distributions as type announcement strategies vary, and this is su cient for implementation in this example. A detailed construction of an implementing game form is given later.
In this example there are three agents. Agent s 1 a n d 2 h a ve t wo t ypes and agent three has only one type. Thus S 1 The gure illustrates indi erence curves of these preferences. Because the preferences are linear, they may b e interpreted as preferences over lotteries. Thus, V 1 (a s 1 1 j ) = 6 a 1 + a 2 ]. Similarly, V 1 (a s 2 1 j ) = 6 a 1 + a 2 ]. Thus, V 1 (a s 1 1 j ) = V 1 (a s 2 1 j ) = 6 a 1 + a 2 ] 8a 2 A. The function u 2 also has the property that the (interim) expected utility determined by u 2 and is independent o f s 2 : V 2 (a s 1 2 j ) = V 1 (a s 2 2 j ) = 6 a 1 + a 2 ] 8a 2 A. The gure depicts indi erence curves for agents 1 and 2. Thus for either player, in any game form the best response set is the same for both types, any strategy which is not weakly dominated for one type is also not weakly dominated for the other type. Because V 1 (a s 1 1 j ) = V 1 (a s 2 1 j ) 8a 2 A and V 2 (a s 1 2 j ) = V 2 (a s 2 2 j ) 8a 2 A, the partition, P , generated by iteration on equivalence classes determined by these functions is the coarsest partition: P = fS 1 g f S 2 g f S 3 g. The only functions measurable relative to this information are constant functions.
Let ft u v wg be four points in A R 2 . (There is no di culty concerning the existence of incentive compatible allocations. For example, z 1 + z 2 = k 8z 2 f t u v wg, then all allocation values lie on an indifference curve o f t h e ( t ype independent) interim expected payo and hence satisfy incentive compatibility). Now, assume that 9 a 2 A, a i > 0 i= 1 2, such t h a t a 2 A, i f 0 a i a i i= 1 2. Consider the social choice function x de ned: x(s 1 1 s 1 2 s 3 ) = ( t t a;2t), x(s 2 1 s 1 2 s 3 ) = ( u u a;2u), x(s 1 1 s 2 2 s 3 ) = ( v v a;2v), x(s 2 1 s 2 2 s 3 ) = ( w w a ; 2w). This is interpreted as follows: at state (s 1 1 s 1 2 s 3 ), the allocation to agents is (t t a; 2t), with a similar interpretation applying to the other states. Finally, assume that 8z 2 f t u v wg, a i ; 2z i > 0 i = 1 2.
Since this function varies over S it is not measurable with respect to P . N o w, consider a two s t a g e game where in the rst period agents announce types. Whether or not the game goes to stage two depends on some action of the third player. Because the third player has just one type, all consistent distributions over the types of players 1 and 2 are determined by B a yes' rule. Consider a deception = ( 1 2 ) where 1 = 1 (truth-telling), while 2 (s 1 2 ) = s 2 2 , 2 (s 2 2 ) = s 1 2 . L e t s = ( s 1 1 s 2 2 ). Now consider two possibilities. In the rst, both agents play the truth-telling strategy (^ ) = ( 1 ^ 2 ). In this case, if s is announced (and this event has positive probability), then if the game goes to stage two, the posterior over types puts probability 1 o n s (since agents are using the truth-telling strategy^ . Then, if agent 1 is faced with a choice between y and z, with probability 1 agent 1 w i l l c hoose y. Now, suppose that the deception is played and s is announced. If the game goes to stage two, then the posterior distribution puts probability 1 o ñ s = ( s 1 1 s 1 2 ). If agent 1 is faced with the choice between y and z, with probability 1 agent 1 will choose z. This variation in behavior is all that is required at stage two for extensive form implementation. Other possible deceptions are treated similarly. F or any an appropriate (y z) pair exist which yields a preference switch. A general mechanism that implements this social choice rule is given later.
Remark 4 The mechanism we g i v e implements the social choice function in pure strategies. If mixed strategies are allowed, and we permit randomization in deceptions, the social choice rule in this example is still implementable. The reason is simple. Even when randomization is allowed, under any deception the posterior distribution at some type announcement will necessarily be di erent from the posterior distribution under truth-telling at that announcement. For example, if agent 2 , t ype s 1 2 announces s 2 2 with positive probability, then the posterior distribution on two's types following signal s 2 2 puts positive probability o n type s 1 2 , whereas in truth-telling, the signal s 2 2 leads to a posterior which puts probability 1 o n s 2 2 . Detailed computations are given in Bergin and Sen (1993). 4 Su cient Conditions for Implementation of a SCF.
Below, we i n troduce posterior reversal, a condition that relates to the reversal of ranking of outcomes by some agent at di erent posterior distributions. Before giving the condition it is necessary to introduce some terminology relating to belief systems in extensive form games. If (s) = 0, the de nition is arbitrary. Di erent equilibrium re nements use di erent means of restricting beliefs o the equilibrium path, but all beliefs re nements satisfy Bayes' rule whenever it is applicable. The case of primary interest is where an event has 0 probability because of a deviation by just one agent. In the present context, this case occurs when (s) > 0, j6 =i sj j (s j )] > 0 a n d si i (s i ) = 0 8s i 2 S i . T h uss has 0 probability because of i (Prob(s ;i ) > 0 and Prob(s ;i s i ) = 0). In this case, given a theory for de ning beliefs along paths that have zero probability, denote the set of posterior distributions consistent with the theory bỹ s by C(s i ). (For example, sequentially consistent beliefs of sequential equilibrium are obtained by taking any sequence f n g that is fully mixed, so n i : S i ! interior( (S i )) ), with f n g ! . T aking any limit of the associated belief sequence gives a consistent beliefs system.)
Belief Systems.
If all agents are playing truth-telling strategies, so that for each j the reporting strategy is^ Thus, if^ is a posterior distribution on S in the consistent set under truth-telling, then given the observation ofs, with s ;i 6 = s ;i , (s ;i s i ) = 0 8s i 2 S i , while under the deception , (s ;i s i ) > 0, for some s i . Summarizing, (s ;i s i ) i s a p o i n t i n t ype space which i n a n y consistent distribution under the deception has probability greater than or equal to (> 0) and in any consistent distribution under truth-telling has probability 0 . (In sequential equilibrium out of equilibrium beliefs are generated as the limits of posterior distributions determined by fully mixed strategies. A detailed discussion of belief systems in the present context is given in Bergin and Sen (1993).)
Posterior Reversal.
The next condition is central to our su ciency result. The notation supp j denotes the support of the distribution in S j (the support of the marginal of on S j ).
De nition 9The social choice function x satis es posterior reversal if for each 2 D n f g, x 6 = x , 9 i j 2 I, s 2 (S) and constant allocations y z 2 X such that 1. As with Bayesian monotonicity w e s a y that the social choice rule satis es posterior reversal at when these conditions are satis ed at that . Because posterior reversal imposes conditions on preferences at posterior distributions, Bayesian monotonicity is not a special case of posterior reversal. (We consider how posterior reversal relates to other concepts in section 4.4.) Recall that the consistent belief sets C(s i ) c a n be calculated solely with knowledge of the sets of player types and the prior distribution. Thus, posterior reversal can be checked without reference to a speci c game form. Intuitively, in truth-telling, if the game goes to stage 2, then y is supported as an equilibrium (condition 2). Therefore the challenge (by i) i n s t a g e 1 is not pro table (condition 1). In the deception, y is not supported in stage 2 and the switch ( b y j) t o alternative z forces an equilibrium switch to outcome a , desired by t h e c hallenger (condition 4) (in the game we construct, the switch f r o m y to z is used to make p l a yer i a dictator in stage 2). Posterior reversal is most easily explained in terms of the examples given earlier. However, before discussing them, some general remarks are appropriate.
Remark 5 Observe that conditions 2 and 3 of posterior reversal imply that 9^ 2 C( s i ^ ), f^ g = 2 C( s i ). In the context of an extensive form game, the interpretation of this requirement i s s t r a i g h tforward. In truthtelling we wish to support some equilibrium outcome with equilibrium behavior on the subform reached by signal, s. If the truth-telling posterior were also in the set of consistent beliefs under the deception, then the equilibrium behavior at that subform in truth-telling is also equilibrium behavior under the deception at that signal. In this case, the signal triggers the same outcome under truth-telling as deception and the extensive form adds nothing that is not achievable in a normal form game.
Remark 6 It is worth noting that for any deception 6 = the sequential consistency condition of sequential equilibrium implies that there is some s such that C( s i ^ ) \ C( s i ) = . F urthermore, this observation is valid whether or not randomization is allowed. The reason is simple: in a deception, some ty p e o f s o m e player is announcing another type with positive probability. F or example, suppose that s i announcess i with positive probability. Then, the conditional probability o n s i givens i is positive, whereas in truth-telling the signals i implies the true type iss i with probability 1. This observation also applies to most forms of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Remark 7 In a general extensive form game agents' strategy choices at any p o i n t m a y b e m uch larger
than their type space. Thus, the uncertainty facing a player at any point in the game may be not just the types of other players, but also (for example) previous choices made. Therefore, in general, the consistent distributions may be de ned on a larger space than the set of types. Nevertheless, given any social choice rule that fails Bayesian monotonicity at some deception , if the rule is implemented in an extensive form game with one round of signaling, then it is necessarily the case that at some subform of the game the beliefs in the \truth-telling" equilibrium are disjoint from the beliefs implied by the candidate deception. Example 1 (Voting). Consider the deception (s) = ( a a a) 8s 2 S in the majority v oting model. Observe that in truth-telling, the posterior distribution puts probability 1 on player 2 being type a, s o t ype a is the only player in the support of the truth-telling distribution (in truth-telling 0 2 C( s i ^ ) implies that supp 2 0 = fag). In the posterior reversal condition, take i = 1 , j = 2 , l e t s = ( a a a), y = a and z = b. L e t s j in condition 2 be a and let t j in condition 3 be b. Since type a prefers a over b, condition 2 is satis ed | every type of player 2 in the support of the truth-telling posterior ranks a at least as good as b. Condition 1 is satis ed because y(a a a) = a = x(a a a), so that x and y are identical. For condition 3, in the deception the posterior distribution coincides with the prior, so that b is in the support of the distribution over two's types. Since type b of player 2 strictly prefers b to a ( z to y), condition 3 is satis ed. Finally, consider u 1 (a a) > u 1 (d a) . To see that condition 2 is satis ed note that the truth-telling posterior distribution puts probability 1 on 3 being type 1. Player 2 has just one type so the support condition just requires that the optimal choice for player two given this posterior distribution is to choose d. Since u 2 (d a) > u 2 (e a), this is satis ed. Under the deception the posterior coincides with the prior and then the optimal choice for 2 is e since V 2 (e) > V 2 (d), so that condition 3 is satis ed. Finally, condition 4 is satis ed since for player 1, V 1 (e) = u 1 (e a) a + u 1 (e b) b > u 1 (a a) a + u 1 (a b) b = V 1 (b).
The third example is similar and will not be discussed. The main result of this section is: Theorem 1 Let n 3. Suppose that the SCF, F = fxg satis es self-selection, posterior reversal at any which fails Bayesian monotonicity, and economic environments. Then F is implementable in an extensive form game in sequential equilibrium.
Proof: The implementing game form is given in the appendix. Remark 8 Any equilibrium concept that satis es sequential rationality and which in a direct reporting mechanism generates beliefs (where beliefs are computed conditional on the report) at every information set such that (PR) holds, is adequate. We use sequential equilibrium.
Posterior reversal may be relaxed in two directions: (a) in challenging a given , m a n y s's may t a k e the game to stage 2 (so that any report in a subset, S (S) m a y t a k e the game to the second stage), and (b) instead of constant allocations in stage 2, type dependent allocations may be allowed. Proof: The proof is given in the appendix.
In point 3 of the theorem, ' is de ned as follows. Given I 0 I, l e t '( s I 0 ) = fs k 2 S k j k 6 Proof: The proof follows directly from theorem 2 with the modi ed utility function.
Note that in this case i cannot equal j. (In condition 2, the specialization would give (for i = j), u i (y s i ) u i (z s i ) 8s i , while condition 3 would require that 9t i 2 S i such t h a t u i (z s i ) > u i (y s i ).) Condition 1 requires that given a deception , there is some s 2 (S), such t h a t x( s) i s ( w eakly) preferred by all types of player i (condition 1) to y. Condition 2 requires that player j, t ype s j (weakly) prefer y to z, while condition 3 requires that some type of player j reporting s j in the deception (some t j such t h a t (t j ) = s j ), strictly prefer z to y. Finally, condition 4 requires that there is some type of player i for which x( s) is not top ranked. Posterior reversal utilizes variation of beliefs on a subform (comparing truth-telling and deception) to generate preference reversals. As mentioned earlier, there are two distinct ways in which this can occur. The rst occurs when stage two b e h a vior doesn't change with beliefs, but the change in beliefs alters the distribution over outcomes and generates the preference reversal. We shall call this generalized Bayesian monotonicity. The second case arises when variation in beliefs at stage two leads to a change in behavior by speci c types of some players. We shall call this chain reversal. Next, we g i v e formal de nitions and relate them to the earlier examples.
De nition 1 0 A social choice rule, x, satis es generalized Bayesian monotonicity (GBM) if given 2 D, x 6 = x, 9i 2 I s i 2 S i and y : S S ! A such t h a t : a. xR i (t i )y i(si) , 8t i 2 S i b. y P i (s i )x Note that when y in the GBM condition is independent of the second argument, GBM reduces to Bayesian monotonicity. I n tuitively, the rst argument o f y(s 0 s ), s 0 , corresponds to the reported type and the second argument corresponds to the \true" type pro le. GBM arises when at the relevant subform, each p l a yer uses the same strategy (on that subform) in both the truth-telling equilibrium and the candidate deception equilibrium. However, with \truth telling", the reportŝ means that subsequent stage choices are made by the types inŝ whereas in a deception with s 0 6 = s reportingŝ, a report ofŝ in stage 1 means that the choices made in subsequent stages are with positive probability m a d e b y s 0 . T h e v oting example given earlier illustrates GBM. Example 1. Consider the deception (s) = ( a a a) 8s 2 S. De ne y(a a a s 1 s 2 s 3 ) = y(b a a s 1 s 2 s 3 ) = s 2 and y( s 1 ŝ 2 ŝ 3 s 1 s 2 s 3 ) = x(a ŝ 2 ŝ 3 ), if either s 2 6 = a or s 3 6 = a. L e t i = 1 a n d s i = b in the de nition of GBM.
In general, changes in beliefs will alter the behavior of given types the same type may act di erently as beliefs change. This is captured by c hain reversal.
De nition 1 1 A social choice rule, x, satis es chain reversal (CR) if given 2 D, x 6 = x, 9i j 2 I, s i 2 S i s j 2 S j and functions y and z, y : S S ! A, z : S S ! A, a. xR
Here, in truth telling, x is supported by y | a c hallenge by i leads to y which is no better than x for any type of i and y is preferable to some z by all types of player j so that y is \supported by y thus deterring a c hallenge by i. In deception, some type of j has a preference ip, choosing z over y under the deception (z preferred to y ). The preference reversal of j leads to di erent c hoices by j and may be used to create di erential incentives for i, comparing truth-telling and deception | hence the term \chain reversal". Chain reversal is illustrated by example 2. We conclude this section by relating these concepts to games with one round of signaling. Call an incomplete information extensive form game a game with one round of signaling, if all players move s i m ultaneously in a rst stage, and there are no equilibria where later stages are reached with positive probability. 3 Thus, player i has a stage 1 message space C i , and the set of possible stage 1 messages, C = n i=1 C i , is partitioned into two sets C 1 and C 2 . A message c 2 C 1 terminates the game with some outcome g(c) 2 Proposition 1 Let ; be a game with one round of signaling which implements x, with implementing strategy ( ). Suppose that for some system of (stage two) beliefs consistent with there is some~ yielding an equilibrium on every subform of the game (in stage 2). 4 Then: a. If, under a belief system determined by , remains an equilibrium across subforms (reachable by a deviation of just one player from ), then x satis es GBM at . b. If, under any belief system determined by , does not de ne an equilibrium on each subform (reachable by a deviation of just one player from ), then x satis es CR. (See Bergin and Sen (1997) for a proof.) Remark 9 Suppose that the social choice rule fails Bayesian monotonicity at some but is implemented by a game with one round of signaling. Suppose that in the implementing game, b. of proposition 1 holds, so that chain reversal applies. Then, with player i, t ype s i as in the de nition of chain reversal, 9w : S S ! A such that w P i (s i )x . T h us, for player i one obtains xR i (t i )y (si) , 8t i 2 S i and w P i (s i )x . The interpretation is that in the deception i type s i gets w with the elimination of y by j. In example 2 above, de ne w = z.) 5 Related Literature. Baliga (1993) and Brusco (1995) develop general necessary and su cient conditions for extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments. Both consider extensive f o r m m e c hanisms with an arbitrary but nite number of stages. Baliga considers the case of private values and independent types, using perfect sequential equilibrium as the solution concept. This re nes sequential equilibrium with forward induction requirements. Brusco allows correlated types and individuals preferences may depend on the types of others perfect Bayesian equilibrium is used as the solution concept. In the construction of our implementing game form, we use sequential equilibrium. Thus, in terms of solution concepts, the one used by Baliga is a re nement of the concept we use, and this in turn re nes the solution concept use by Brusco. The use of di erent solution concepts is not unimportant (especially if trying to narrow the game between necessary and su cient conditions for extensive form implementation.) In all three papers, candidate \deception" equilibria are \knocked out" by p l a y o the equilibrium path. Thus, for example, for a given game form, using perfect Bayesian equilibrium (instead of sequential equilibrium) makes it is easier to support "truth-telling" as an equilibrium since there is a larger set of beliefs to support continuation payo s along a path reached by deviation on the other hand it is more di cult to eliminate deception equilibria | for the same reason | because there is a larger set of equilibrium continuation payo s available to support the deception as an equilibrium. The converse applies when perfect sequential equilibrium is used.
In the works of Brusco and Baliga, the necessary conditions parallel the complete information conditions given in Abreu and Sen (1990) and Moore and Repullo (1988) . In both, the necessary conditions require a string of social choice rules and associated beliefs, such that at the end of the string, a preference reversal occurs (when expected utility is computed with the posterior distribution de ned under truth telling vis-a-vis the expected utility computed with the posterior distribution de ned under deception.) Their su ciency conditions build on the necessary conditions, and are somewhat complex. Since the sets of consistent o r admissible beliefs vary with the solution concept, the circumstances under which a preference reversal occurs will also. 5 Our su ciency condition starts from the same fundamental requirement | that somewhere a preference reversal occurs in the extensive form, comparing truth-telling to deception. As mentioned above, in both Baliga's and Brusco's work, this observation forms the basis for the necessary conditions. On the other hand, we take a d i e r e n t direction and pursue further the way i n w h i c h a reversal occurs identifying \splitting" properties of posterior distributions comparing truth-telling to deception, and identifying the exact ways in which v ariations in beliefs translate into variations in the distributions over outcomes. A key central observation in our work is that somewhere in the extensive form, at some subform there must be some belief determined in truth-telling which is disjoint from the set of possible beliefs under deception. In our framework this then leads to the identi cation of conditions under which this belief separation can be translated into a preference reversal. (Regardless of the solution concept use, this belief separation must occur somewhere, so the basic idea is applicable, whatever solution one has in mind.) This viewpoint lends itself naturally to a signaling interpretation: a given signal generates di erent beliefs under truth-telling than under deception. For many problems of mechanism design in incomplete information environments, this signaling viewpoint provides a useful approach.
Finally, some comments on the use of di erent solution concepts and the \gap" between necessary conditions and su ciency conditions are appropriate. Consider a multistage game. The possibility e x i s t s that a candidate deception equilibrium is eliminated by the non-existence of equilibrium at a subform which is unreachable by a unilateral deviation of any p l a yer. At rst sight, this would imply that it may n o t be necessary to have a connection back to the rst stage (in terms of preference reversals) to eliminate a candidate deception equilibrium. When perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the solution concept, beliefs on a subform reached by a correlated deviation are a superset of the beliefs determined by a unilateral deviation | comparing subforms at the same stage that are identical, apart from assigned beliefs. (Furthermore, beliefs are determined by local considerations at each of the subforms: the assignment of beliefs at one subform does not restrict the assignment of beliefs at the other.) As a consequence, in perfect Bayesian equilibrium, nonexistence of equilibrium for any beliefs at the subform reached with a correlated deviation implies nonexistence under all beliefs at the subform reached by the unilateral deviation (when identical subforms, apart from beliefs, are considered). This in turn is used to provide the chain leading to a preference reversal in the necessary conditions of Brusco. (With independent t ypes (as in the work of Baliga), the issue may not arise.) In contrast, with sequential equilibrium, beliefs are assigned simultaneously with one test sequence. The issue of whether or not one can identify beliefs at certain subforms as subsets of beliefs at another is then central in determining whether or not the preference reversal in the extensive f o r m m ust be connected back to the rst stage through a chain of preferences. 
Outcome is x(s)
At least one of (i) 9i 6 = j (i) 6 
C. Implementing Equilibria
We proceed in the usual way. In Step 1 we s h o w that there is a sequential equilibrium of the game which supports x. In Step 2, we shall show t h a t x is the unique sequential equilibrium outcome.
(1) The allocation x is an equilibrium allocation Consider the following strategy pro le (f f o g ) (and associated consistent beliefs), de ned as follows: The outcome of (f g ) i s x. Suppose that Stage 2 has been reached following the history h 1 ( ). The strategy g requires all players to play W irrespective o f t ype. This yields the allocation y as the outcome. The only player who can change the outcome is player j and the outcome that obtains if he deviates is z . But according to part 2 of posterior reversal, y R j (s j 0 ( ))z for all types of j which h a ve positive probability under 0 ( ). 8 Therefore, the actions prescribed by g are sequentially rational relative to the beliefs 0 ( ). Consider a deviation where some player does not truthfully report types: f i (s i ) = ( i (s i ) ^ n i ). The outcome is then x ( i ^ ;i) . B u t xR i (s i )x ( i ^ ;i) , according to Self-Selection. Next consider a deviation by some player i of the kind: f i (s i ) = ( i (s i ) n i ) w h e r ẽ i 2 D i and 2 D(i). If the game goes to stage two ( s = s( ) is realized), then the outcome is y , otherwise (8s 2 Snf sg) the outcome is x (~ i ^ ;i) (s) ( o r x(s 0 ) where s 0 6 = s is the announced state). Thus, the outcome over states is w , so the strategy of player i yields the allocation w (~ i ^ ;i) . P art 1 of posterior reversal ensures that this deviation is not pro table.
Finally, note that histories in H 0 are reachable only by j o i n t deviations of two agents. Therefore, the strategies and beliefs constitute a sequential equilibrium.
(2) The allocation x is the unique equilibrium allocation We rst claim that there can be no sequential equilibrium in which some type of player either announces a deception not equal to^ or a non-zero integer. Suppose that this is false. Then there is a sequential equilibrium in which player i of type s i sends a message such that either i 6 = or n i 6 = 0. Let the outcome of this strategy pro le be some allocation b 2 X. Let T = s i S ;i S. Since the environment is economic there exists an individual j 6 = i and a constant allocation c 2 X such that (c T b)P j (s j )b for all s j 2 S j . Note that any t ype s j of player j can attain the allocation c T b be precipitating the \integer game" and announcing an integer greater than the maximum of all integers announced by all other players. This yields a history in H 0 where j is dictator (H oj ). The details of the argument m a y be found in Jackson (1991) . By an analogous argument, it follows that all sequential equilibria must have the property that in Stage 2, all types of players unanimously announce either R or W .
The only candidate sequential equilibrium left to consider is the one where Stage 1 strategies are of the form: 8 s i 2 S i and i 2 I, f i (s i ) = ( i (s i ) ^ 0) for some i 2 D i . In this case the game is over in Stage 1 and the outcome is x . Let i 2 I be such t h a t 2 D(i), s = s( ), chosen according to the posterior reversal condition. Also, let C( s i ) be the collection of consistent distributions at the unique history h 1 2 H 1 determined by . Consider the following deviation by p l a yer i : f 0 i (s i ) = ( s i 0). 9 The game now carries over to Stage 2 with positive probability. Consider the strategy pro le where all players in this subform 7 Recall if i announces 6 = stage 2 is reached only if every agent k announces n k = 0 and s k = s k ( ) and all agents other than i announce (j) = . 8 In fact, under truth-telling, i f s is announced then the posterior puts probability 1 on player j type s j : only when j = i is the posterior not determined on S j . 9 Or f 0 i (s i ) = ( i (s i ) 0) since this will reach the second stage with positive probability.
choose W so that the outcome is y . F or any system of beliefs 0 2 C( s i ), there exists a type of player j t j who is better-o defecting in order to get allocation z (using part 3 of posterior reversal). Therefore, the unique equilibrium in this subform is the one where all players choose R (that it is an equilibrium is immediate). As a consequence of the Stage 1 deviation by p l a yer s i , the outcome is an allocation of the form (w T x ) where T = fs 2 Sj (s) = sg and w is a constant allocation chosen by i, t ype s i . F rom condition 4 of posterior reversal, such an allocation exists. Player s i will therefore deviate and the strategy pro le f cannot be part of a sequential equilibrium.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 2.
Consider condition 1 in P R . F or given and the associated i j 2 I, s 2 
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Implementing game forms with \One Round of Signaling" in incomplete information environments.
James Bergin and Arunava S e n January 1997
We consider games with one round of signaling, brie y described in the text. Let C i be the set of actions player i can take in stage 1, and C = n i=1 C i . In the rst stage a strategy for i is a function i : S i ! C i . Thus, = ( 1 : : : n ) : S ! C. Although discussing pure strategies, write (c i s i ) to the denote the probability that type s i chooses action c i . One action will have probability 1 . W e can use the notation i (s i ) to denote a pure strategy of agent i type s i , with i (s i ) 2 C i . P artition C = C 1 C 2 , where the game terminates if c 2 C 1 is chosen, and goes to stage 2 if c 2 C 2 is chosen. Let g : C 1 ! A, where A is the set of outcomes. For the discussion to follow, we f o c u s o n a t wo stage game, so the second stage is the nal stage. However, the argument here extends almost without modi cation to the case of multiple stages following period 1. We explain why in a remark below. The discussion depends critically on the beliefs at the beginning of period 2, and not on the number of stages remaining in the game.
If the game goes to stage 2, then a strategy for i is a function from type and history to actions. Let B 2 A be the outcome determined by the game at the end of stage 2 when c was chosen in the rst period (c 2 C 2 ) and b 2 B c was chosen in period 2. To simplify notation, we will assume that when the game goes to stage 2, only the choice made in stage 2 a ects the outcome. This simplifying assumption does not a ect the result (see the remark below), and the notation is less bothersome. Thus, given a choice b 2 B c , l e t f(b) 2 A denote the outcome determined in the game in stage 2.
Proposition 2 Let ; be a game with one round of signaling which implements x, with implementing strategy ( ). Suppose that for some system of (stage two) beliefs consistent with there is some~ yielding an equilibrium on every subform of the game (in stage 2). Then: a. If, under a belief system determined by , remains an equilibrium across subforms (reachable by a deviation of just one player from ), then x satis es GBM at . b. If, under any belief system determined by , does not de ne an equilibrium on each subform (reachable by a deviation of just one player from ), then x satis es CR.
The Equilibrium Strategy Yielding x(s).
Let ( ) be an equilibrium strategy which implements the social choice rule (so that the second period is not reached.) Conditional on the second period being reached (a zero probability e v ent), must determine an equilibrium on each subform of the game, relative to a conditional belief system determined by .
Because is optimal in period 1 (given is used if period 2 is reached), the following condition must hold. For each i and for each s i 2 S i , w e require that for all^ i :
